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1206 
Notes 
 
WARR v. JMGM GROUP: MARYLAND DRAM SHOPS ESCAPE 
DUTY TO FORESEEABLE VICTIMS OF DRUNK DRIVING 
KATHERINE O’KONSKI∗ 
In Warr v. JMGM Group,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
considered whether it should recognize “dram shop liability” by holding a 
tavern liable for harm to an innocent third party caused by an intoxicated 
patron.2  The court held that, absent a special relationship, it would not 
recognize dram shop liability and concluded that a tavern does not have a 
duty to prevent harm caused by an intoxicated patron.3  The majority’s 
focus on the tavern’s omission in failing to prevent an intoxicated patron 
from driving led it to erroneously conclude that recognizing dram shop 
liability would impose a duty to protect the general public in violation of 
Maryland precedent and the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315.4  
The court should have recognized that the tavern’s affirmative action in 
serving a visibly intoxicated patron was relevant to assigning liability.5  
Conceptualizing the tavern’s conduct as an action is consistent with 
Maryland’s and other states’ case law, and would have enabled the court to 
find that the Dogfish Head tavern owed a duty to the Warrs under both the 
general principles of negligence and the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 315.6  While this case presents a difficult challenge in balancing the 
interests of Maryland’s tavern businesses with the imperative to reduce 
drunk driving fatalities, the court should have considered that imposing 
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 1.  433 Md. 170, 70 A.3d 347 (2013). 
 2.  Id. at 177, 70 A.3d at 351. 
 3.  Id. at 199, 70 A.3d at 364. 
 4.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 6.  See infra Part B. 
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dram shop liability would deter such destructive behavior while providing 
compensation for those injured.7 
I.  THE CASE 
On the evening of August 21, 2008, Michael Eaton, an out-of-state 
resident,8 patronized the Dogfish Head Alehouse in Gaithersburg, 
Maryland,9 where he had the reputation of “being a habitual drunkard.”10  
He stayed at the Dogfish Head for six hours, consuming fourteen bottles of 
beer, two drinks of hard liquor, and another drink someone purchased for 
him.11  Eaton left Dogfish Head at 10:00 P.M., but returned forty minutes 
later and consumed three more bottles of beer and one shot of tequila.12  At 
this point, Eaton became violent, and his server informed him that he would 
not be served any more alcohol.13  A Dogfish Head employee offered to call 
a cab, but Eaton refused.14  Instead he left Dogfish Head in his vehicle, 
driving down Interstate 27015 at “eighty-eight to ninety-eight miles per 
hour.”16  He collided into the back of a car driven by William Warr, and 
fled from the scene.17  Two girls were in the back of the Warrs’ car when 
Eaton hit it.18  Jazimen, the Warrs’ ten-year-old granddaughter,19 was killed 
in the crash, while her sister Cortavia sustained injuries for which she was 
flown in a helicopter to the hospital.20  Eaton, who turned himself in to the 
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 8.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Warr v. JMGM Group, No. 341698-V, at 9 (Mont. 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 9.  Warr, 433 Md. at 174, 70 A.3d at 349. 
 10.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Warr v. JMGM Group, No. 341698-V, at 2 (Mont. 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 9. 
 14.  Id. at 2. 
 15.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 175, 70 A.3d 347, 350 (2013).  
 16.  Id. at 200, 70 A.3d at 365 (Adkins, J. dissenting). 
 17.  Dan Morse, Bar Sued After Patron’s Crash Kills Girl, WASH. POST CRIME SCENE (Dec. 
14, 2010, 7:57 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/crime-scene/montgomery/moco-bar-sued-
after-patron-cra.html. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  The Court of Appeals refers to Jazimen as the Warrs’ daughter, while the newspapers 
refer to her as a granddaughter.  Compare Warr, 433 Md. at 174, 70 A.3d at 349 (majority 
opinion) (calling the girls “daughters”), with Morse, supra note 17 (calling the girls 
“granddaughters” but noting that the Warrs were raising the girls).  The Warrs’ filing with the 
court refers to Jazimen as William Warrs’ “deceased granddaughter.”  Corrected Brief of 
Petitioner at 1, Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 70 A.3d 347 (2013) (No. 57), 2013 WL 
6813262, at 1.  
 20.  Dan Morse, ‘I Will Never Forgive the Man’; Md. Girl, 12, Attends Sentencing Hearing 
for Motorist Who Killed Her Sister, WASH. POST, July 31, 2009 at B1. 
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police the next morning,21 received an eight-year prison sentence for 
vehicular manslaughter.22 
William and Angela Warr filed suit in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County against JMGM Group, LLC, owner of Dogfish Head 
Alehouse, to recover for injuries their family sustained in the accident and 
for the death of Jazimen.23  The Warrs alleged that JMGM was liable for 
their injuries because the bar had a duty to refuse to provide alcoholic 
beverages to an individual who was visibly intoxicated or who was 
considered a “habitual drunkard.”24  Although the circuit court was 
convinced that “the factual underpinnings of this case made a change in 
Maryland jurisprudence with respect to dram shop liability ripe to the 
core,”25 it nonetheless granted JMGM’s motion for summary judgment.26 
The circuit court reasoned that dram shop liability is not recognized as a 
cause of action under Maryland case law, and that the decision to overturn 
precedent was within the province of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.27  
The Warrs appealed the circuit court’s decision; but before any proceedings 
in the Court of Special Appeals took place, the Court of Appeals granted 
the Warrs’ petition for certiorari to consider whether Maryland should 
recognize dram shop liability as a cause of action.28 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Dram shop liability cases in Maryland traditionally have been argued 
on the grounds of proximate cause: Courts considered drinking, rather than 
furnishing alcohol, to be a proximate cause of any injury inflicted by the 
negligent conduct of the purchaser.29  This trend continued even as other 
states created dram shop liability through judicial decision and legislative 
enactment.30  In a parallel line of cases starting with the Court of Appeals’s 
decision in Lamb v. Hopkins,31 however, Maryland courts began to explore 
the extent to which a defendant could be liable in tort for failing to protect 
                                                          
 21.  Morse, supra note 17. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Warr v. JMGM Group, No. 341698-V, at 1 (Mont. 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 24.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 175, 70 A.3d 347, 350 (2013). 
 25.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Warr v. JMGM Group, No. 341698-V, at 1 (Mont. 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 26.  Id. at 14. 
 27.  Id. at 13. 
 28.  Warr, 433 Md. at 174, 70 A.3d at 349. 
 29.  See infra Part II.A. 
 30.  See infra Part II.B. 
 31.  303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985). 
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the plaintiff from the actions of a third party.32  These cases evolved into 
Maryland dram shop liability jurisprudence, setting the stage for the court’s 
decision in Warr. 
A.  Maryland’s Early Dram Shop Liability Cases Declined to Find 
Taverns Liable Because Selling Alcohol Was Not the Proximate 
Cause of the Injury 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first considered dram shop liability 
in its 1951 decision, State v. Hatfield.33  A tavern owned by Elizabeth 
Hatfield sold alcohol to an intoxicated minor, who then drove on the 
incorrect side of the road and killed James Joyce.34  The court reasoned that 
Hatfield was not liable because selling alcohol to a minor was not a 
proximate cause of Joyce’s death.35  In an oft-quoted passage, the court 
explained that “human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own 
torts.”36  In so holding, the court recognized a strong common law argument 
that the actions of the patron—drinking alcohol and choosing to drive—
were a superseding cause that protected the tavern owner from liability.37 
When the Court of Appeals next considered dram shop liability close 
to thirty years later in Felder v. Butler,38 it acknowledged that changing 
social conditions surrounding alcohol and driving could merit a change in 
policy.39  In Felder, Madeline Hawkins drove into oncoming traffic after 
drinking at a bar, causing grievous injuries to the plaintiffs.40  The plaintiffs 
argued that the tavern should be held liable because it illegally served 
Hawkins alcohol after she was visibly intoxicated.41  The Felder court 
recognized that many other states had adopted dram shop liability, but the 
court nevertheless declined to follow suit.42  Specifically, the court 
emphasized concerns over the inability to develop a workable test for 
imposing liability, fear of collusive suits, and a reluctance to expose social 
hosts to the possibility of liability for serving alcohol to intoxicated 
                                                          
 32.  See infra Part II.C. 
 33.  197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951). 
 34.  Id. at 251, 78 A.2d at 755.  
 35.  Id. at 254, 78 A.2d at 756. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 255, 78 A.2d at 757.  
 38.  292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981). 
 39.  See id. at 182, 438 A.2d at 499 (commenting that “societal problems like that presented 
by the senseless carnage occurring on our highways” might require a change in law). 
 40.  Id. at 175, 438 A.2d at 495. 
 41.  Id. at 175–76, 438 A.2d at 495. 
 42.  Id. at 182, 438 A.2d at 498–99. 
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guests.43  Instead, the court left the decision of whether to adopt dram shop 
liability to the legislature.44 
B.  Other State Courts Adopted Dram Shop Liability Based on a Duty 
to Protect a Third Party from Foreseeable Injury 
Although Maryland declined to adopt dram shop liability in the 1980s, 
many other states recognized that taverns owed a duty to protect others 
from foreseeable injury at the hands of their intoxicated patrons.  Waynick 
v. Chicago’s Last Department Store45 and Rappaport v. Nichols46 sparked 
dram shop liability’s modern renaissance in 1959.47  In Waynick, a diversity 
action where one of the participating states, Illinois, had a Dram Shop Act, 
the Seventh Circuit found an alcohol licensee liable for the sale of alcohol 
to intoxicated persons.48  In Rappaport, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
concluded that, even without a Dram Shop Act, a tavern owner was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.49  The New Jersey court noted 
that “a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted” from 
the tavern owner’s negligent conduct in serving a visibly intoxicated 
patron.50 
As many more courts began to recognize dram shop liability in the 
ensuing decades, these courts also began to analyze taverns’ duties to 
protect third parties from the torts of their intoxicated patrons.51  For 
                                                          
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 184, A.2d at 499–500. 
 45.  269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959). 
 46.  156 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959).  
 47.  See Felder, 292 Md. at 184, 438 A.2d at 499 (noting that Waynick and Rappaport 
initiated a “new trend of cases” departing from the common law argument of no proximate cause). 
 48.  See Waynick, 269 F.2d at 326 (holding that store owners who allowed two patrons to 
purchase and consume large amounts of alcohol over several hours in a parking lot and then drive 
away to collide with another car were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries since the 
Illinois Dram Shop Act made the sale of liquor to any intoxicated person unlawful). 
 49.  See Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 8 (reasoning that the sale of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated 
person should be considered the proximate cause of the injury since “the unreasonable risk of 
harm . . . to members of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen”). 
 50.  Id. at 9. 
 51.  See, e.g., Simmons v. Homatas, 925 N.E.2d 1089, 1100 (Ill. 2010) (holding that a 
nightclub owed a duty to “refrain from assisting and encouraging . . . tortious conduct” after the 
club ejected a visibly intoxicated patron from the premises and required him to drive away, 
resulting in a collision that killed another driver); Dickinson v. Edwards, 716 P.2d 814, 819 
(Wash. 1986) (en banc) (finding that a restaurant and employer could be held liable for furnishing 
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated employee at a company banquet after that employee consumed 
twenty drinks and left the banquet in his car, severely injuring a motorcyclist); Carver v. Schafer, 
647 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a tavern had a duty to avoid serving a 
visibly intoxicated patron under a standard of ordinary care after the patron, who had been 
drinking heavily at the defendant’s tavern, struck a police officer standing on the shoulder of an 
interstate highway); Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533, 539 (Haw. 1980) (holding that Hawaii’s 
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example, in 1964, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted dram shop 
liability in Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973.52  After Thomas Gross 
struck two pedestrians on his way home following several hours of 
drinking, one of the pedestrians, James Jardine, brought suit alleging that 
the tavern was liable because it negligently served Gross alcohol while he 
was visibly intoxicated.53  The court agreed, holding that the tavern had a 
duty entirely apart from statute54 to refrain from serving Gross after he 
became visibly intoxicated.55  The court explained that “[t]he first prime 
requisite to de-intoxicate one who has, because of alcohol, lost control over 
his reflexes, judgment and sense of responsibility to others, is to stop 
pouring alcohol into him.”56 
In Ontiveros v. Borak,57 the Supreme Court of Arizona abandoned the 
common law rule that rejected liability and held a dram shop liable for the 
torts of its patrons.58  In Ontiveros, Reuben Flores consumed about thirty 
beers at a bar owned by Peter Borak.59  Flores left the bar in his vehicle, 
only to hit and severely injure a pedestrian.60  The court held that the tavern 
had a common law duty to conduct itself with reasonable care and prudence 
when dispensing alcohol.61  Given the universal use of automobiles, the 
court reasoned that the patron’s decisions to consume alcohol and then get 
behind the wheel were foreseeable intervening acts.62  The court explained 
that “in selling liquor to an intoxicated customer, where it is evident that the 
customer may injure himself or others as a result of the intoxication, a 
vendor is not acting as a reasonable person would.”63 
                                                          
liquor control statute supported the imposition of a duty on a tavern keeper to refrain from serving 
a visibly intoxicated individual under the general principles of negligence after a driver coming 
from a tavern collided head-on with the plaintiff’s vehicle).  
 52.  198 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1964). 
 53.  Id. at 551. 
 54.  See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493 (West 2012) (outlawing the sale of alcohol to 
intoxicated persons). 
 55.  Jardine, 198 A.2d at 553. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983). 
 58.  Id. at 213; see also Collier v. Stamatis, 162 P.2d 125, 128 (Ariz. 1945) (holding that a 
tavern owner who served a minor was not liable for her later detention as a “juvenile delinquent,” 
reasoning that the young woman chose to become intoxicated and was therefore “the author of her 
own injury”); Pratt v. Daly, 104 P.2d 147, 149 (Ariz. 1940) (commenting that a plaintiff, deceased 
in an accident while extremely intoxicated, “was the author of his own death”). 
 59.  Ontiveros, 667 P.2d at 203.  
 60.  Id.  Juan Ontiveros was partially paralyzed and developed mental retardation as a result 
of the accident.  Id. at 203–04. 
 61.  Id. at 208–09.  The court also noted that Arizona statute made it unlawful for a liquor 
licensee to sell alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person.  Id. at 209. 
 62.  Id. at 206. 
 63.  Id. at 209 (quoting Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 674 (Alaska 1981)). 
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Similarly, in El Chico Corp. v. Poole,64 the Supreme Court of Texas 
adopted dram shop liability after Rene Saenz, who had been drinking 
heavily at a restaurant, ran a red light and killed Larry Poole.65  The court 
reasoned that the restaurant had a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid 
foreseeable injury to others, commenting that “[t]he risk and likelihood of 
injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person whom the licensee 
knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as injury resulting 
from setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.”66  The court 
remarked that the Texas Penal Code criminalized the sale of alcohol to 
visibly intoxicated patrons and noted that the purpose of the Code was to 
protect the welfare of the general public.67  Aligned with the Code, the court 
held that the tavern had a duty to the general public not to serve alcoholic 
beverages to a visibly intoxicated person.68  Thus, Texas and several other 
states grounded their reasoning for adopting dram shop liability on the 
ubiquitous use of automobiles and the resulting foreseeability of an 
intoxicated person injuring others if served more alcohol. 
C.  Lamb v. Hopkins and Progeny: Influencing Maryland’s Dram Shop 
Liability Jurisprudence 
The decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Lamb v. Hopkins 
sparked a line of cases dealing with an actor’s duty to protect another from 
injury by a third party.  Initially, the court examined the extent to which an 
actor owes a duty of reasonable care to protect another from the acts of a 
third party, apart from Maryland’s dram shop liability jurisprudence.  The 
court’s reasoning in these cases, however, soon became incorporated into 
Maryland’s dram shop liability decisions.69 
In Lamb v. Hopkins, the Lambs brought suit against Russell 
Newcomer, Jr.’s probation officers after Newcomer severely injured the 
Lamb’s infant in a drunk driving accident.70  The officers knew but never 
reported to the appropriate authorities that Newcomer had been convicted of 
driving while intoxicated several times during his probation.71  The Lambs 
argued that the officers owed a duty to exercise due care to protect those 
who would be foreseeably harmed by Newcomer’s dangerous drunk driving 
                                                          
 64.  732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987). 
 65.  Id. at 308–09. 
 66.  Id. at 311. 
 67.  Id. at 312 (citing TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE. ANN. §101.03 (West 1978)). 
 68.  Id. at 313. 
 69.  See infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. 
 70.  303 Md. 236, 240, 492 A.2d 1297, 1299 (1985).  Laura Lamb, five months old at the time 
of the accident, was rendered a quadriplegic.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 239–40, 492 A.2d at 1299. 
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habit.72  In holding that the probation officers did not owe a duty to protect 
the Lambs, the Court of Appeals concluded that the probation officers “had 
neither the right nor the ability to control Newcomer’s conduct.”73  Finding 
no binding precedent, the court applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
Sections 314 and 315.74  These sections explain that, absent a special 
relationship between the actor and the third person or the actor and the 
person harmed, an actor owes no duty to prevent a third person from 
causing harm to another.75  According to the court, the probation officers 
could not be held liable because they did not have a special relationship 
with Newcomer or with the Lambs.76 
In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County,77 a county police officer found an 
intoxicated John Millham sitting in his truck with the engine running and 
lights on.78  Rather than charging Millham with drunk driving, the officer 
told him “to pull his truck to the side of the lot and to discontinue driving 
that evening.”79  As soon as the officer left, however, Millham drove a short 
distance and collided with pedestrian John Ashburn.80  The court, citing 
Lamb and Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315, reasoned that, absent 
a special relationship, the officer had no duty to control Millham’s conduct 
in order to prevent harm to another.81  Because Ashburn did not allege any 
facts that showed he had created a special relationship with the officer,82 the 
court held that the officer owed no duty to protect Ashburn.83 
While Maryland courts generally continued to decide dram shop 
liability cases on the grounds that the sale of alcohol was not a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries,84 an important exception occurred a year 
                                                          
 72.  Id. at 241, 492 A.2d at 1300. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 242, 492 A.2d at 1300. 
 75.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314–15 (1965). 
 76.  Lamb, 303 Md. at 253, 492 A.2d at 1306. 
 77.  306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986). 
 78.  Id. at 619, 510 A.2d at 1079. 
 79.  Id. at 619–20, 510 A.2d at 1079. 
 80.  Id. at 620, 510 A.2d. at 1079.  Ashburn lost his leg as a result of the accident.  Id.  
 81.  See id. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1083 (noting that there is generally “no duty to control a third 
person’s conduct so as to prevent personal harm to another, unless a ‘special relationship’ exists 
either between the actor and the third person or between the actor and the person injured”). 
 82.  Id. at 631–32, 510 A.2d at 1085. The court explained that “[i]n order for a special 
relationship between police officer and victim to be found, . . . the police officer [must] 
affirmatively act[] to protect the specific victim . . . , thereby inducing the victim’s specific 
reliance upon the police protection.”  Id. at 631, 510 A.2d at 1085. 
 83.  Id. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087. 
 84.  See, e.g., Vollmar v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., 831 F.Supp.2d 862, 868 (D. Md. 2011) (finding 
that a resort was not liable for injuries to the plaintiff in a boating accident caused by one of its 
patrons, because although the resort served the patron alcohol and then allowed him to operate a 
boat in an intoxicated state, the sale of alcohol did not proximately cause the plaintiff’s injuries); 
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after Ashburn was decided.  In Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, Inc.85 
Charles Wilkes, driving intoxicated after attending a company party, 
swerved across the center line and struck Evelyn Hargis’s vehicle.86  Hargis 
brought suit against Wilke’s employer, arguing that Top Notch Laminates 
should be held liable because it continued serving Wilkes at the party after 
he was visibly intoxicated and permitted him to drive in that state.87  In its 
assessment of liability, the court did not address the proximate cause 
arguments espoused by Hatfield and Felder.88  Rather, the court pointed to 
Lamb for the proposition that “there is no liability to a third person absent a 
‘special relationship’ with a clear right to control.”89  According to the 
court, without an existing Dram Shop Act and no special relationship 
between either the employer-defendant and the plaintiff or the employer and 
the intoxicated driver, no duty of care, and thus no liability, existed.90 
The Court of Appeals more clearly articulated its reasoning for 
applying Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315 in Valentine v. On 
Target, Inc.91  After several handguns were stolen from gun retailer On 
Target, “Joanne Valentine was murdered outside of her home . . . by an 
unknown assailant” wielding one of the stolen weapons.92  Her husband 
brought suit, alleging that the retailer “owed a duty . . . to exercise 
reasonable care in the display of handguns . . . [in order] to prevent theft 
and illegal use.”93  The court found that, absent a special relationship, On 
                                                          
Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md. App. 466, 470, 476, 749 A.2d 241, 243, 246 (2000) 
(finding that a liquor vendor was not liable for the sale of alcohol to a minor who later drove while 
intoxicated and died in a single-car accident, reasoning that “the proximate cause of the collision 
was not the unlawful sale of liquor but the negligence of the individual who drank the liquor”); 
Moran v. Foodmaker, Inc., 88 Md. App. 151, 159, 594 A.2d 587, 590–91 (1991) (finding that a 
restaurant was not liable for serving a visibly intoxicated patron who drove into and severely 
injured a pedestrian, reasoning that “Maryland remain[ed] aligned with the small minority of 
states” that did not recognize proximate cause between the sale of liquor and a tort committed by 
the buyer); Hebb v. Walker, 73 Md. App. 655, 662, 536 A.2d 113, 116 (1988) (finding that a party 
host was not liable for the death of a partygoer in a car accident, reasoning in part that the host 
was not the proximate cause of the accident since he had not served the driver any alcohol at the 
party). 
 85.  70 Md. App. 244, 520 A.2d 1115 (1987). 
 86.  Id. at 246, 520 A.2d at 1115.  Wilkes and another employee, Robert Wade, left the party 
together and were driving at high speeds, engaging in “horseplay” on the road.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 247, 520 A.2d at 1116. 
 88.  See id. at 248, 520 A.2d at 1116 (referring to Hatfield and Felder merely for the 
proposition that Maryland had not yet adopted dram shop law action judicially or through the 
legislature). 
 89.  Id. at 249, 520 A.2d at 1117. 
 90.  Id. at 251–52, 520 A.2d at 1118.  The court noted that although the intoxicated driver was 
the defendant’s employee, the defendant did not act affirmatively by directing the employee to 
drive in his intoxicated state.  Id. at 252, 520 A.2d at 1118. 
 91.  353 Md. 544, 727 A.2d 947 (1999). 
 92.  Id. at 547, 727 A.2d at 948. 
 93.  Id. 
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Target did not owe a duty to protect the public from the illegal use of its 
firearms.94  The court reasoned that there were no circumstances indicating 
an increased probability that the guns would be stolen, and it would be 
unfair to hold the store liable for unreasonably remote consequences.95  To 
avoid imposing an “indefinite duty to the general public” upon gun shop 
owners, the court would not impose liability without a “special 
relationship” as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315.96 
To support its contention that On Target had no duty to protect the 
public from criminal acts committed with its weapons, the court in 
Valentine cited Scott v. Watson.97  There, James Aubrey Scott, Jr. was shot 
in the apartment’s underground parking garage.98  Scott’s sister brought 
suit, claiming that the landlord breached a duty to protect Scott from 
criminal acts committed by third parties in common areas of the building 
that were within the landlord’s control.99  In holding that the landlord had 
no duty to protect his tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on 
premises, the court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315, 
reasoning that its holding was a subsidiary of the broader rule that, in the 
absence of statutes or a special relationship, a private person is under no 
duty to protect another from criminal acts committed by a third person.100 
The Court of Appeals last dealt with the issue of liability for the 
actions of a third party in Barclay v. Briscoe.101  In Barclay, the court 
considered whether an employer should be liable to an injured motorist 
when an employee, who had been working for over twenty-two consecutive 
hours, was involved in a car accident on his way home.102  The court, in 
finding that the employer owed no duty to the injured driver, emphasized 
that the foreseeability of the accident did not itself impose a duty in 
negligence terms.103  Rather, the court cited Lamb and the Restatement 
                                                          
 94.  Id. at 555–56, 727 A.2d at 952–53. 
 95.  Id. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950.  The court explained that foreseeability “is based upon the 
recognition that a duty must be limited to avoid liability for unreasonably remote consequences,” 
and reasoned that the plaintiff had not argued convincingly that the shop owner should have 
foreseen not only that a thief would steal guns from the store, but also that a third unknown party 
would obtain those guns and use them in a criminal manner.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 556, 727 A.2d at 953. 
 97.  278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976). 
 98.  Id. at 162, 359 A.2d at 550.  At the time, Scott was facing trial under a multi-count 
indictment charging him with conspiracy to distribute heroin.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 161, 359 A.2d at 550. 
 100.  Id. at 166, 359 A.2d at 552.  The court also opined that “[i]f the landlord knows, or 
should know, of criminal activity against persons or property in the common areas, he then has a 
duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the existing circumstances, to eliminate the 
conditions contributing to the criminal activity.”  Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554 (emphasis omitted). 
 101.  427 Md. 270, 47 A.3d 560 (2012). 
 102.  Id. at 273, 47 A.3d at 562. 
 103.  Id. at 294, 47 A.3d at 574–75. 
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(Second) of Torts for the proposition that an actor is not obligated to take 
action to come to another’s aid or protection, even when he realizes that 
action on his part is necessary.104  Without a special relationship between 
the employer and the injured driver or the employer and the employee, no 
duty existed.105 
Thus, while other states recognized dram shop liability by focusing on 
the duty of a tavern to take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable injury, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals did not find a similar duty.106  Rather, in case 
law starting with Lamb, it articulated the limits of an actor’s duty to take 
steps to avoid injury to another at the hands of a third party.107  As a result, 
Maryland courts began to limit a tavern’s duty to protect third parties from 
the torts of their patrons in the dram shop context.108 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Warr v. JMGM Group, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County’s decision that dram shop 
liability is not recognized as a cause of action in Maryland.109  In so 
holding, the court determined that the Dogfish Head Alehouse did not have 
a duty to protect the Warrs, as members of the general public, from the 
harm caused by the tavern’s patrons.110  In finding that the Dogfish Head 
owed no duty to the Warrs, the court examined (A) the existence of a duty 
under Maryland dram shop liability precedent; (B) the existence of a duty 
under the general principles of negligence; and (C) the existence of a duty 
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.111  The dissenting opinion 
countered each of these arguments in turn.112 
A.  Maryland Precedent on Dram Shop Liability 
The majority’s first step in considering whether to adopt dram shop 
liability was to examine Maryland precedent on the issue.113  The court 
                                                          
 104.  Id. at 295, 47 A.3d at 575. 
 105.  See id. at 295–96, 47 A.3d at 575–76 (explaining that no circumstances existed that 
would create a special relationship between an employer and an employee acting outside the scope 
of his employment, since the employee was driving in his own vehicle on a public road after 
working hours). 
 106.  See supra Part II.B. 
 107.  See supra Part II.C. 
 108.  See supra note 84. 
 109.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 189–90, 70 A.3d 347, 358–59 (2013). 
 110.  Id. at 199, 70 A.3d at 364. 
 111.  See infra Parts III.A–C. 
 112.  See infra Parts III.A–C. 
 113.  Warr, 433 Md. at 178–80, 70 A.3d at 351–53.  Judge Battaglia delivered the opinion of 
the court.  Id. at 173, 70 A.3d at 349. 
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pointed to Hatfield and Felder as representing the current state of dram 
shop liability in Maryland, emphasizing that both cases held that a tavern is 
not liable for the torts of its patrons.114  The court acknowledged that the 
analysis in both cases was limited to proximate cause, but argued that 
neither case provided for a tavern’s duty to refrain from serving an 
intoxicated person.115  While the court recognized that Felder pointed to an 
increasing prevalence of dram shop liability laws in other states, it 
nonetheless emphasized Felder’s holding that the absence of legislative 
action on dram shop liability counseled against its adoption by judicial 
decision.116 
By contrast, the dissent emphasized that Hatfield and Felder, “our only 
cases on dram shop liability, demonstrate that this [c]ourt’s refusal to 
recognize dram shop liability has been based solely on the old common law 
rule that the selling of alcohol was not a proximate cause of injuries 
resulting from the subsequent torts of an intoxicated customer.”117  The 
dissent argued that because Hatfield and Felder did not address duty 
directly, the majority had no basis for deciding that those precedents did not 
support a duty to the Warrs.118  The dissent focused on the Felder court’s 
invitation for legislative action on the issue119 and argued that given the 
alarming rates of death resulting from drunk driving incidents, the judiciary 
should impose liability because the General Assembly has refused to do so 
in the years since Felder was decided.120 
B.  Liability Under the General Principles of Negligence 
The court then turned to the general principles of negligence law to 
examine whether the Dogfish Head owed a duty to the Warrs.121  The court 
examined several factors to determine whether a duty existed, including the 
                                                          
 114.  Id. at 179–80, 70 A.3d at 352–53. 
 115.  Id. at 178–79, 70 A.3d at 352.  The court pointed out that Maryland law attaches 
criminal, but not civil, liability for the sale of alcohol to obviously intoxicated persons.  Id. at 179, 
70 A.3d at 352.  The court also asserted that it could not extrapolate civil liability from a criminal 
statute.  Id. at 197–99, 70 A.3d at 363–64.  This Note, however, does not address that argument, 
which is secondary to the majority’s central conclusion that the tavern owed no duty to the Warrs. 
 116.  Id. at 179–80, 70 A.3d at 353.  The court explained that the legislature’s failure to 
implement dram shop liability at the time Felder was decided reflects that it was disfavored as a 
social policy.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 204, 70 A.3d at 367 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 118.  Id. at 203, 70 A.3d at 367. 
 119.  Id. at 204, 70 A.3d at 367.  The dissent focused on the Felder court’s assertion that it 
would decline “for now, to join the new trend” of judicially imposed dram shop liability laws.  Id. 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 184, 438 A.2d 494, 499 (1981)). 
 120.  Id. at 202, 70 A.3d at 366. 
 121.  Id. at 181–83, 70 A.3d at 353–54 (majority opinion). 
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foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiffs.122  In concluding that Eaton’s 
decision to drive was not foreseeable, the court reasoned that the causal 
relationship between the provision of alcohol to an intoxicated person and 
the death of a third party was not assured.123  There was no guarantee that 
Eaton would drive when he left the bar; indeed, the Dogfish Head 
employees attempted to call a taxi for him.124  Moreover, the court reasoned 
that whether Eaton would choose to drive was not foreseeable because the 
tavern had no control over Eaton’s conduct.125 
Further, the majority argued that foreseeability was not the relevant 
inquiry in the context of establishing liability for the actions of a third party 
to the suit.126  Rather, the determinative inquiry was whether the tavern had 
control over Eaton by virtue of some special relationship.127  The majority 
reasoned that Maryland courts accepted the general rule that there was no 
duty to control a third person’s conduct so as to prevent harm to another 
absent a special relationship.128  The tavern could not control Eaton’s 
                                                          
 122.  Id. at 182, 70 A.3d at 354.  In determining the existence of a duty, the court considered a 
multitude of factors including: 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and 
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to 
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, 
and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Id. (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (en banc)). 
 123.  Id. at 183, 70 A.3d at 354. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 183–84, 70 A.3d at 355. 
 126.  Id. at 183, 70 A.3d at 355. 
 127.  Id.; see infra Part III.C. 
 128.  Warr, 433 Md. at 183–84, 70 A.3d at 355; see also Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 295, 
47 A.3d 560, 575 (2012) (concluding that an employer was not liable for the death of a driver 
killed in a collision by its employee who was driving home after twenty-two hours of consecutive 
work, reasoning that the employer had no special relationship either with its employee or the 
injured driver); Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 750, 955 A.2d 769, 786 (2008) (finding that an 
insulin manufacturer was not liable for injuries to a patient caused by the side effects of the 
medication because the manufacturer owed no duty to protect the plaintiff absent a special 
relationship, as this would amount to the manufacturer “ow[ing] a duty to the world, [as] an 
indeterminate class of people”); Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 447, 487–90, 
805 A.2d 372, 396–97 (2002) (finding that emergency dispatchers do not owe a duty to protect 
individuals from harm after they contact 911, reasoning that absent a special relationship, the 
dispatchers did not owe a duty to the general public); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 306 Md. 
617, 628, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986) (finding that a police officer was not liable for injuries to a 
pedestrian inflicted by an intoxicated driver whom the police officer had stopped but had not 
arrested, reasoning that “absent a ‘special relationship’ between police and victim, liability for 
failure to protect an individual citizen against injury caused by another citizen does not lie against 
police officers”); Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 242, 492 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1985) (explaining 
that where an actor does not control the conduct of a third party, “the fact that the actor realizes or 
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actions “in driving or walking, for example.”129  Thus, the majority 
reasoned that the tavern would only have a duty to protect the Warrs if it 
had a special relationship with either Eaton or the Warrs.130  Because no 
special relationship existed, the majority reasoned that the tavern did not 
owe a duty to protect the Warrs from harm caused by Eaton.131 
On these points, the dissent made several counter-arguments.  The 
dissent interpreted Maryland precedent as recognizing the difference 
between active and passive risk creation when determining the existence of 
liability.132  Citing Barclay, the dissent argued that “[n]o duty will lie if an 
employer simply knows that an employee is tired, or if a bar simply knows 
that a patron is drunk.  The alleged duty does not attach until the bar serves 
an alcoholic drink following the visible intoxication.”133  Contrary to the 
majority’s assertion that the Dogfish Head had no control over Eaton’s 
conduct, the dissent argued that “the bar’s conduct, in over-serving Eaton, 
actively created a risk of harm to the Warrs and others, by exposing the 
Warrs to a greater risk than they would have faced absent the bar’s 
conduct.”134  Hence, what the majority categorized as the tavern’s absence 
of control, the dissent categorized as the tavern’s “misfeasance.”135  The 
dissent emphasized that when a defendant has actively contributed to the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff, Maryland precedent dictates that the “special 
relationship rule” laid out in Lamb does not apply because this rule is meant 
to apply only to a defendant’s omissions, or, in other words, his “passive 
failure to act.”136 
Focusing on the Dogfish Head’s affirmative act of serving Eaton after 
he was visibly intoxicated and the foreseeability that the Warrs would be 
harmed as a result, the dissent argued that a normal foreseeability analysis 
was the relevant inquiry in determining the Dogfish Head’s liability.137  
Taking up the factors enumerated in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California,138 the dissent argued that (1) the injury to the plaintiff was 
                                                          
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself 
impose upon him a duty to take such action” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 129.  Warr, 433 Md. at 183–84, 70 A.3d at 355. 
 130.  Id. at 183, 70 A.3d at 355.   
 131.  Id. at 189–90, 70 A.3d at 358–59.   
 132.  Id. at 219, 70 A.3d at 376 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 133.  Id. at 220, 70 A.3d at 377 (emphasis omitted). 
 134.  Id. at 208, 70 A.3d at 370. 
 135.  Id.  The majority responded to the dissent’s contention that the tavern actively created the 
risk that Eaton would drive home by pointing out that no one controlled Eaton’s behavior; he 
chose to drink and drive of his own volition.  Id. at 185–86 n.11, 70 A.3d at 356 n.11 (majority 
opinion). 
 136.  Id. at 216, 70 A.3d at 374 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 137.  Id. at 227–28, 70 A.3d at 381–82. 
 138.  551 P. 2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
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foreseeable;139 (2) imposing a duty would create a policy of preventing 
future harm;140 (3) the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
injury suffered was close enough to impose liability;141 (4) the defendant’s 
conduct deserved moral blame;142 and (5) establishing a common law duty 
to refrain from serving a visibly intoxicated patron created a negligible 
burden on the tavern.143  Thus, the dissent concluded that the common law 
imposed an ordinary duty of reasonable care on a commercial vendor to 
refrain from serving any patron who is visibly intoxicated.144 
C.  Liability Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
The majority acknowledged that when adopting dram shop liability, 
courts in other states—most notably Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Texas—
have referred to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315.145  The 
majority explained that these courts used Section 315 to uphold a tavern’s 
“duty to control the conduct—drinking—of patrons in order to protect the 
general public.”146  However, the Warr court reasoned that it would be 
unfair to expect the tavern to owe an unlimited duty to the world to protect 
the public from the acts of its patrons.147  Although other courts accepted 
such a far-reaching duty, the Warr court asserted that Maryland law does 
not support a duty to the general public.148 
                                                          
 139.  Warr, 433 Md. at 229, 70 A.3d at 382.  Judge Adkins explained that the link between 
drunk driving and traffic fatalities is common knowledge and that such accidents are responsible 
for hundreds of deaths in Maryland each year.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 232, 70 A.3d at 384.  The dissent argued that imposing liability would prompt 
licensed vendors to protect the public from drunk driving by training bartenders to avoid serving 
visibly intoxicated persons.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 234, 70 A.3d at 385.  In Judge Adkins’s view, the “magnitude of the harm” 
imposed—here the death of a child—“justifies the imposition of a duty to a large class of 
individuals.”  Id.  
 142.  Id.  (“The majority of the general public would be outraged at a commercial vendor who, 
for the sake of profit, continues to serve an already drunk person well past the line of being 
‘visibly under the influence’ . . . and then sends him on his way, where he gets behind the wheel 
of a vehicle and kills a ten-year-old girl.”). 
 143.  Id. at 234–35, 70 A.3d at 386.  Judge Adkins explained that since Maryland law 
criminalizes service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person, imposing civil liability for the same 
offense does not impose any new burden on the tavern owners.  Id. at 235, 70 A.3d at 385–86 
(citing MD. CODE ANN., Art. 2b, § 12-108 (a)(I)(ii) (West 2013)). 
 144.  Id. at 235, 70 A.3d at 385. 
 145.  Id. at 192–93, 70 A.3d at 360–61 (majority opinion). 
 146.  Id. at 193, 70 A.3d at 361. 
 147.  Id. at 193–94, 70 A.3d at 361.  Illustratively, the court points to the Supreme Court of 
Texas’s conclusion that employees of a tavern were under “the general duty to exercise reasonable 
care to avoid foreseeable injury to others.”  Id. at 193, 70 A.3d at 361 (quoting El Chico Corp. v. 
Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 148.  Id. at 193–94, 70 A.3d at 361. 
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By contrast, the dissent argued that Section 315 could not properly be 
applied to the facts of Warr.149  For the dissent, Section 315 was meant to 
shield the innocent bystander from liability for failing to protect another.150  
It was not meant to protect defendants like the Dogfish Head that 
contributed to the dangerous conduct by serving a visibly intoxicated 
patron.151  To support this contention, the dissent pointed out that the 
commentary for these rules indicate that they apply “only where the peril in 
which the actor knows that the other is placed is not due to any active force 
which is under the actor’s control.”152  The dissent concluded: “the 
Restatement clearly contemplates that a defendant (the bar), who creates a 
risk of harm is under the ordinary duty to exercise reasonable care and may 
be negligent if it (the bar) actively creates an unreasonable risk that a third 
person (Eaton) will do harm to another (the Warrs).”153 
The dissent further argued that commentary to the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts undermined the majority’s position, explaining that “Section 315, 
however, neglected to clarify that its no-duty rule was conditioned on the 
actor having played no role in facilitating the third party’s conduct.”154  
Since the Dogfish Head played an active role in the Warrs’ injuries by 
serving Eaton after he was visibly intoxicated, the dissent argued that the 
special relationship rule should not apply.155  Thus, while the majority cited 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315 to support its proposition 
that it cannot find liability without a special relationship, the dissent argued 
this Section makes clear that the special relationship rule did not apply to 
the facts of this case.156 
Finally, while the majority emphasized that, due to the significant 
public policy considerations involved, the Maryland legislature is in a far 
better position to “impose liability on tavern owners for injuries caused by 
intoxicated patrons,”157 the dissent concluded, “[W]ith no legislative action 
on the issue in the thirty-two years since Felder, and an even larger trend of 
                                                          
 149.  See id. at 212, 70 A.3d at 372 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (“What is clear then . . . is that the 
‘special relationship’ rule in Section 315, which we adopted as Maryland’s common law, simply 
does not apply in this case.”). 
 150.  See id. at 211, 70 A.3d at 371 (“[T]he rules in Section 314 and 315 would protect the 
bystander . . . because the bystander was merely passive and did not actively perform an act of 
force contributing to the harm suffered.”). 
 151.  Id. at 212, 70 A.3d at 372. 
 152.  Id. at 210, 70 A.3d at 371 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314 cmt. d (1965)). 
 153.  Id. at 212, 70 A.3d at 372. 
 154.  Id. at 213, 70 A.3d at 373 (emphasis omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS 
§ 37 cmt. a (2012)).  
 155.  Id. at 212, 70 A.3d at 372. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 199, 70 A.3d at 364 (majority opinion). 
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jurisdictions supporting liability, . . . the Felder Court’s declining change 
‘for now’ should be amended to: now is the time for change.”158 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC, the Maryland Court of Appeals held 
that a tavern did not owe a duty to protect “members of the general public” 
from the torts of its patrons.159  This holding rests on two premises: First, 
the court conceptualized the tavern’s contribution to the accident as an 
omission—that is, failing to prevent the patron from leaving the tavern in 
his car.160  Second, the court concluded that the tavern had no affirmative 
duty to protect the “indeterminate” class of individuals that may be hurt by 
an intoxicated driver.161  The court failed to properly consider the tavern’s 
affirmative action in serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated patron, a 
consideration that is consistent with Maryland precedent and the general 
principles of negligence when assessing an actor’s liability for the actions 
of a third party.162  Moreover, the court erred in its conclusion that the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315 does not support adopting dram 
shop liability, when in fact using Section 315 to impose a duty on the tavern 
protects the foreseeable victims of drunk driving and aligns with Maryland 
precedent as well as the reasoning of other states.163  The court should have 
considered that imposing liability on the tavern not only would protect 
Maryland citizens by deterring taverns from over-serving individuals who 
will pose a danger to the community should they choose to drive, but also 
would help compensate the grievous harm done to victims of drunk driving 
accidents.164 
A. The Warr Court Erred by Failing to Properly Consider the Tavern’s 
Affirmative Act of Serving Alcohol to a Visibly Intoxicated Patron 
A situation where a patron goes to a bar, is served alcohol past the 
point of intoxication, then drives off the premises and injures someone else 
involves both acts and omissions on the part of the patron and the tavern.  A 
fundamental difference between the majority and dissent’s analysis is their 
underlying disagreement over whether the conduct relevant to assigning 
liability should be classified as an act or an omission.165  The majority 
                                                          
 158.  Id. at 252, 70 A.3d at 396 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 159.  Id. at 199, 70 A.3d at 364 (majority opinion). 
 160.  Id. at 183–84, 70 A.3d at 355. 
 161.  Id. at 193–95, 70 A.3d at 361–62. 
 162.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 163.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 164.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 165.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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should have considered the tavern’s actions in serving a visibly intoxicated 
patron when assigning liability because doing so would have been more 
consistent with the approach used by Maryland courts and other states in 
determining when a defendant should be liable for the acts of a third 
party.166  Moreover, since the relevant conduct stems from acts rather than 
omissions, the majority should have decided whether the tavern owed a 
duty to the Warrs under the general principles of negligence rather than 
apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315 “special relationship” 
standard.167 
1.  Maryland Precedent Suggests That the Warr Court Should Have 
Conceptualized the Tavern’s Role in the Accident as an Action 
The Dogfish Head served Eaton alcohol and continued to do so after 
he was visibly intoxicated;168for obvious reasons, these are the Dogfish 
Head’s acts.  After the tavern would no longer serve Eaton additional 
alcohol due to his violent behavior, the Dogfish Head employees failed to 
prevent him from driving.169  In arguing that the tavern should not be held 
liable for the torts of its patrons absent a special relationship, the majority 
focused on the tavern’s omission in preventing Eaton from driving as the 
relevant conduct in assigning liability.170  Classifying the tavern as an 
innocent bystander, the majority drew from Maryland case law as well as 
the Restatement (Second)of Torts Section 315 in its reasoning that the 
Dogfish Head was not obligated to act to protect another from serious harm 
absent a special relationship, even if it had the means to do so.171  By 
contrast, the dissent conceptualized the relevant conduct in assigning 
liability as the tavern’s action in serving a patron that is visibly 
intoxicated.172  The dissent reasoned that a jury could conclude that the 
tavern actively created a risk to the Warrs and others by serving Eaton after 
he was visibly intoxicated. 173 
                                                          
 166.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 167.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 168.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 174–75, 70 A.3d 347, 349–50 (2013). 
 169.  Id. at 175, 70 A.3d at 350. 
 170.  See id. at 182, 70 A.3d at 354 (explaining that because the tavern did not affirmatively 
control whether Eaton operated a motor vehicle in his intoxicated state, the Dogfish Head did not 
owe a duty to protect the public from harm he caused while driving under the influence). 
 171.  Id. at 194–95, 70 A.3d at 361–62.  The court explained that an “actor is not subject to 
liability if he fails, either intentionally or through inadvertence, to exercise his ability so to control 
the actions of third persons as to protect another from even the most serious harm.”  Id. at 194, 70 
A.3d at 361 (quoting Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 295, 47 A.3d 560, 575 (2012)). 
 172.  Id. at 208, 70 A.3d at 369–70 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 173.  See id. (focusing on the fact that the Dogfish Head “took a non-dangerous Eaton and, by 
serving him drink after drink after drink, helped to transform him into a dangerous Eaton”). 
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The majority’s conclusion that the tavern should not be liable is only 
sound if the conduct properly considered is the tavern’s omission in failing 
to prevent Eaton from driving.  The majority, however, overlooks the fact 
that the tavern actively contributed to the Warrs’ injuries, making an 
intoxicated person more dangerous by continuing to serve him alcohol.174  
Put another way, the Dogfish Head is in the business of operating a 
tavern—an aspect of this business is ensuring that customers who have 
consumed enough alcohol to pose a danger to the community do not get 
behind the wheel.175  In this sense, the entire scenario of serving a patron 
and taking reasonable measures to ensure he or she does not drive should be 
characterized as a tavern’s acts.  By either classification, the tavern was not 
an innocent bystander.  It actively contributed to the Warrs’ injuries; and 
thus, liability should not be determined by the “special relationship rule” of 
Section 315, but rather by the general principles of negligence.176 
The court also erred by considering the tavern’s duty to protect others 
from the torts of its patrons within the framework of Maryland’s third-party 
liability jurisprudence stemming from Lamb v. Hopkins.  The court 
correctly interpreted that line of cases to suggest that an actor should not be 
held liable for the actions of a third party it could not control.177  The 
Dogfish Head, however, had control over Eaton’s level of intoxication and 
whether he drove away from the tavern while intoxicated. The facts of Warr 
are thus distinguishable from both Lamb and its companion case Ashburn in 
that the tavern-defendant actively took part in making Eaton dangerous by 
serving him at least twenty drinks until he became a violent, aggressive, and 
intoxicated patron.178  By contrast, the probation officers in Lamb did not 
actively contribute to probationer Newcomer’s drinking habits or his 
decision to drive drunk; they merely failed to inform the sentencing court of 
                                                          
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Alcohol service training programs in Maryland and in other states recognize that taverns 
must address many risks involved in alcohol service.  See, e.g., MARYLAND REST. ASS’N, Alcohol 
Awareness and Responsible Alcohol Service Training, 
http://www.marylandrestaurants.com/RAM/Classes/Alcohol_Awareness_Certification/RAM/_Cla
sses/Alcohol_Awareness_Training.aspx?hkey=d066d745-0234-40fa-9a69-90d51e8f5c82 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2014) (“Alcohol service involves many risks.  Failure to act responsibly could 
result in fines, imprisonment, losing your liquor license, increased insurance costs, or losing your 
business.”); MAINE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE, A 
GUIDE FOR BARS AND RESTAURANTS SERVING ALCOHOL 12 (2010) (recommending that taverns, 
in refusing to serve intoxicated patrons, attempt to find them an alternate ride home and noting 
that every employee “plays a part in protecting the establishment’s liquor license, bottom-line, 
reputation and safety of . . .customers”). 
 176.  Warr, 433 Md. at 209, 70 A.3d at 370 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 177.  Id. at 186, 70 A.3d at 356 (majority opinion).  The majority asserted that Eaton’s 
conduct, rather than the conduct of the tavern, should be at issue.  Id. at 185, 70 A.3d at 355–56. 
 178.  Id. at 199–200, 70 A.3d at 365 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
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his prior convictions.179  Similarly, the police officer in Ashburn did not 
actively contribute to John Millham’s drunken condition; the officer merely 
failed to arrest Millham after finding him drunk behind the wheel.180  
Because the tavern in Warr was an active participant in creating Eaton’s 
dangerous condition, the court’s reasoning in Lamb and Ashburn that an 
actor owes no duty of care when it has neither the right nor the ability to 
control a third party’s conduct is inapplicable. 
Similarly, the court cited Barclay v. Briscoe for the proposition that 
Maryland case law supported its application of the “special relationship” 
rule to the facts of Warr.181  The majority erred, however, because it failed 
to recognize Barclay’s significance for determining the point at which 
liability for the acts of a third party should attach.  The majority frames the 
situation in Barclay as the employer’s omission, stating that there was no 
duty to prevent a fatigued employee from driving home.182  Indeed, “[n]o 
duty will lie if an employer simply knows that an employee is tired, or if a 
bar simply knows that a patron is drunk.”183  The majority overlooked the 
crucial distinction that the Dogfish Head acted affirmatively by serving 
Eaton drinks past the point of visible intoxication, while the employer in 
Barclay did not assign any more shifts to the employee after he became 
fatigued.184  Had the employer subsequently assigned work to the employee 
once it became clear that the employee was fatigued, Barclay would be 
analogous to the facts of Warr.185  The holding in Barclay reflects its 
understanding that liability can only attach for an employer’s acts: “[A]n 
affirmative act of control by the employer following and prompted by the 
employee’s incapacity must be present in order for a duty to arise . . . .”186  
The Dogfish Head, unlike the employer in Barclay, negligently contributed 
to Eaton’s compromised state by serving him alcohol after he was visibly 
intoxicated.187  Thus, assigning the tavern a duty to protect others from 
                                                          
 179.  See Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 241, 492 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1985) (explaining that 
the probation officers owed no duty of care to the Lambs because the officers “had neither the 
right nor the ability to control Newcomer’s conduct”). 
 180.  Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 306 Md. 617, 619–20, 510 A.2d 1078, 1079 (1986). 
 181.  Warr, 433 Md. at 185, 70 A.3d at 356 (majority opinion). 
 182.  Id. at 184, 70 A.3d at 355. 
 183.  Id. at 220, 70 A.3d at 377 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 184.  See Barclay v. Briscoe, 472 Md. 270, 306, 47 A.3d 560, 582 (2012) (asserting that the 
employer had no duty to protect other drivers since it did not act affirmatively by assigning the 
fatigued employee any more shifts). 
 185.  George W. Ingham, Comment, Another Drink, Another Hour: Using Dram Shop Liability 
to Determine Employer Liability for Injuries Caused by Fatigued Commuting Employees, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 565, 578–79 (2010) (arguing that dram shop liability jurisprudence should form a 
basis for determining the liability of employers for the torts of fatigued employees). 
 186.  Barclay, 472 Md. at 306, 47 A.3d at 582 (emphasis omitted). 
 187.  Warr, 433 Md. at 220, 70 A.3d at 377. 
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Eaton, once it acted affirmatively in over-serving him, aligns squarely with 
Maryland precedent. 
2.  Recognizing the Tavern’s Role in the Accident as an Action 
Rather Than an Omission Aligns with the General Principles of 
Negligence 
Since the tavern was an active participant in creating Eaton’s 
dangerously intoxicated condition, the court should have applied the 
general principles of negligence instead of the “special relationship” rule, 
meant for innocent bystanders, to determine whether a tavern owed a duty 
to the Warrs.188  Although the court noted that an important factor in 
determining the existence of a duty is the foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff, the court gave short shrift to the foreseeability analysis by 
asserting that “[i]t is simply not a given that imbibing alcohol and driving 
are coextensive.”189  But this reasoning is only accurate in a vacuum; the 
court ignored the widely acknowledged problem of drunk driving in the 
nation and in Maryland.  While the majority asserted that only the 
consequences of an actor’s own behavior are readily derived,190 a tavern is 
in the business of serving alcohol—-a natural and frequent result of which 
is drunk driving.  When the tavern continued to serve Eaton alcohol after he 
became visibly intoxicated, it should have been abundantly clear that in his 
compromised state, he might make the irrational decision to drive.191  
Indeed, the Dogfish Head servers were aware that this was Eaton’s 
intention, especially because he had arrived to the Dogfish Head by car and 
lived out-of-state.192  Thus, it was completely foreseeable that Eaton would 
leave the Dogfish Head in his vehicle and pose a danger to others after 
refusing a cab. 
The tavern had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect the Warrs 
from that eventuality.193  The tavern’s duty arises because its action in 
serving Eaton after he was visibly intoxicated greatly increased the risk of 
                                                          
 188.  For a list of these principles, see supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 189.  Warr, 433 Md. at 183, 70 A.3d at 354–55 (majority opinion). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for 
Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 559 (2000) (explaining that the rationale for the visibly 
intoxicated standard is that when an “intoxicated person attempts to purchase alcohol, it should be 
abundantly clear to the server that it is dangerous to add to the customer’s intoxication”). 
 192.  See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Warr v. JMGM Group, No. 341698-V, at 9 (Mont. 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012) (noting that the bartenders at the Dogfish Head realized that Eaton 
“would not make it home quickly” because he had an out-of-state driver’s license). 
 193.  See Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 306 Md. 617, 627–28, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986) 
(explaining that the existence of duty is a function of many factors, including most importantly the 
foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff). 
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harm to the Warrs.194  The tavern was in a unique position to prevent a 
foreseeable harm and was obligated to take reasonable care to do so.195  
Moreover, the Tarasoff factors that the majority used to determine whether 
the tavern owed a duty to the Warrs clearly indicate this affirmative 
responsibility.196  The close connection between the tavern’s conduct of 
serving Eaton over twenty drinks and the Warrs’ injury, as well as the 
moral blame associated with the tavern’s conduct and the imperative to 
prevent future drunk drivers from harming others on the road, counsels that 
the tavern owed a duty to protect the Warrs under the general principles of 
negligence.197 
Because the tavern had a duty to protect drivers who were on the road 
simultaneously with Eaton, the Warr court should have analyzed the 
tavern’s behavior relative to this duty using a standard well-articulated by 
Prosser and Keaton: 
 The duty to take precautions against the negligence of 
others . . . involves merely the usual process of multiplying the 
probability that such negligence will occur by the magnitude of 
the harm likely to result if it does, and weighing the result against 
the burden upon the defendant of exercising such care.198 
In a recent study, thirteen percent of drivers nationwide reported 
driving under the influence of alcohol.199  In Maryland, approximately one-
third of all traffic deaths involve alcohol.200  This destructive behavior is all 
too frequent, and the magnitude of the harm that can result from such 
activity is astronomical.201  In Warr, this behavior resulted in the death of a 
ten-year-old girl.202 
                                                          
 194.  See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33 (5th ed. 
1984) (explaining that “[t]here are other situations in which the defendant will be held liable 
because his affirmative conduct has greatly increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff through the 
criminal acts of others”). 
 195.  See id. (noting that “the defendant’s special responsibility may arise because he is in a 
position to control the dangerous person, or is in some other unique position to prevent the harm, 
and so may be held to have an obligation to exercise reasonable care to do so”). 
 196.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 235, 70 A.3d 347, 386 (2013) (Adkins, J., 
dissenting). 
 197.  Id. at 233–34, 70 A.3d at 384–85. 
 198.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 194.  
 199.  SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., NSDUH-109, THE 
NSDUH REPORT: STATE ESTIMATES OF DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING (2012).  
 200.  See infra text accompanying note 246. 
 201.  See, e.g., El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987) (noting the 
connection between drinking and driving fatalities to support the application of dram shop 
liability). 
 202.  Warr, 433 Md. at 200, 70 A.3d at 365. 
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Considering the harm that results from drunk driving, the burden 
placed on the tavern to avoid serving visibly intoxicated people is not 
particularly onerous; as the dissent noted, the Maryland General Assembly 
already imposes this burden by assigning criminal liability for this 
behavior.203  Prosser and Keaton further counsel that “[i]t becomes most 
obvious when the actor has reason to know that he is dealing with persons 
whose characteristics make it especially likely that they will do 
unreasonable things.”204 Certainly the tavern employees—after serving 
Eaton over twenty drinks and cutting him off when he became intoxicated, 
aggressive, and violent205—would have known that Eaton might, with his 
impaired judgment, decide that he was fit to drive home. 
Because the tavern acted affirmatively in assisting to make Eaton 
dangerous to other drivers on the road, it had a duty to protect these drivers 
under both Maryland precedent and the general principles of negligence.  In 
failing to stop serving Eaton alcohol once he became visibly intoxicated, 
the Dogfish Head did not meet a reasonable standard of care.  Thus, the 
tavern should be exposed to liability for Eaton’s conduct. 
B.  The Majority Erred in Its Conclusion That Restatement (Second) of 
Torts Section 315 Does Not Support Adopting Dram Shop Liability 
While the Warr court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 315 did not support the imposition of liability on the tavern without 
a special relationship, courts in Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Texas relied on 
this section for the precise purpose of imposing dram shop liability.206  The 
Warr court argued that it could not apply Section 315 absent a special 
relationship because the states that did so imposed a duty on the tavern to 
protect the public as a whole, an outcome that Maryland law does not 
support.207  This argument, however, is unconvincing: First, imposing dram 
shop liability on taverns would not mean creating an indefinite duty to the 
public at large, but rather a duty to those foreseeable victims of drunk 
driving accidents.208  Second, of the states that applied Section 315 to 
support adopting dram shop liability, only the Supreme Court of Texas used 
Section 315 to impose a duty on the tavern to protect the public at large; 
                                                          
 203.  Id. at 234–35, 70 A.3d at 385–86 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Art. 2b, § 12-108 (a)(1)(ii) 
(West 2013)). 
 204.  See KEETON ET AL., supra note 194.  They elaborate that “the actor may be required 
to . . . refrain from . . . [letting] an intoxicated person . . . have an automobile, or more liquor.”  Id. 
 205.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Warr v. JMGM Group, No. 341698-V, at 9 (Mont. 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 206.  See supra Part II.B. 
 207.  Warr, 433 Md. at 193–94, 70 A.3d at 361 (majority opinion). 
 208.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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Maryland should follow the approach of Pennsylvania and Arizona by 
framing the tavern’s responsibility as one to refrain from serving a visibly 
intoxicated patron to protect foreseeable victims of drunk drivers.209 
1.  Assigning the Tavern a Duty to Protect Foreseeable Victims of 
Drunk Driving Aligns with the Interpretation of Section 315 in 
Maryland Case Law 
To support its application of the “special relationship” rule of Section 
315, the court pointed to the rule’s underlying rationale, articulated in 
Valentine v. On Target.210  There, the court explained that “[o]ne cannot be 
expected to owe a duty to the world at large to protect it against the actions 
of third parties, which is why the common law distinguishes different types 
of relationships when determining if a duty exists.”211 This rationale, 
however, is unconvincing for several reasons.  First, imposing a duty on the 
Dogfish Head would not require it to protect the public as a whole, but 
rather those foreseeable victims of drunk driving accidents—drivers who 
are on the road simultaneously with an intoxicated patron.  This imposition 
makes sense because the tavern’s ability to prevent harm caused by 
intoxication is inherently limited.212  While a tavern can prevent an 
intoxicated patron from getting behind the wheel, it has no control over any 
of the patron’s acts subsequent to making the decision to drive.  Any other 
harm committed by the patron is too attenuated from the original act of 
serving him alcohol while visibly intoxicated for liability to attach.213  For 
example, a tavern that served a patron after he was visibly intoxicated could 
not be held liable if that patron later committed assault, because the 
criminal intent behind the patron’s act is a superseding cause.214  Indeed, 
states that recognize dram shop liability do not hold taverns liable for 
unforeseeable criminal acts committed by their patrons, even if these 
patrons were served alcohol after they became visibly intoxicated.215 
                                                          
 209.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 210.  Warr, 433 Md. at 193–94, 70 A.3d at 361. 
 211.  Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 553, 727 A.2d 947, 951 (1999). 
 212.  See Smith, supra note 191, at 554 (explaining that the purpose of dram shop laws are not 
to prevent drunkenness, but rather to reallocate the social harms of drinking to the businesses that 
profit from the sale of alcohol). 
 213.  See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (“The risk reasonably 
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is a risk to another or to 
others within the range of apprehension.”). 
 214.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (“The act of a third person in 
committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting 
therefrom, although the actor’s negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an 
opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime . . . .”). 
 215.  See infra note 234. 
O’KonskiFInalBookProof 5/6/2014  12:22 PM 
1230 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:1206 
Second, as the dissent indicated, Maryland law does not impose 
unlimited liability to any member of the public, but rather limits an 
individual’s duty of care only to those who would foreseeably be harmed by 
the conduct.216  In so doing, Maryland courts have recognized that it would 
be unfair not only to impose on actors a duty to protect the public as a 
whole, but also that an actor should not be released from liability merely 
because the victim of its negligence was unidentifiable.217  While the 
majority analogized the facts of Warr to those of Valentine, the situations 
are distinguishable.  The movements of a stolen weapon are nearly 
impossible to trace and may impact an unidentifiable class of persons.218  
Unlike the owner of the shop in Valentine, who did not know of any 
circumstances that would indicate an increased probability that a thief 
would steal guns from the store and use them in an illegal manner,219 the 
danger an intoxicated person poses to his fellow drivers is both concrete 
and applicable to a discrete number of individuals.  Thus, because there is a 
specific, foreseeable class of victims likely to be harmed by a drunk driver, 
Section 315’s “special relationship” standard is not applicable in this 
context. 
Finally, Maryland precedent on third-party liability is misstated in 
Valentine.  In holding that a store owner does not owe a duty to protect 
people from the illegal use of its weapons, the Valentine court cited Scott v. 
Watson for the rule that a private person is under no special duty to protect 
                                                          
 216.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 226–27, 70 A.3d 347, 381 (2013) (Adkins, J., 
dissenting); see also Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 148, 642 
A.2d 219, 226 (1994) (commenting that Maryland courts have “recognized that the concept of 
duty as owing to all persons the exercise of reasonable care to protect them from harm has to be 
limited if liability for unreasonably remote consequences are to be avoided”); Henley v. Prince 
George’s Cnty., 305 Md. 320, 336, 503 A.2d 1333, 1341 (1986) (finding that an employer could 
be liable for the death of a third party at the hands of an employee who had threatened prospective 
intruders, reasoning that the employer had a duty to protect those that would foreseeably “be 
expected to come into contact with” the employee).  But see Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 355 
Md. 58, 77, 642 A.3d 180, 189 (1994) (finding that Exxon, the prior occupier of land, did not owe 
a duty to the subsequent lessee to avoid contamination of the property because it was not 
foreseeable that Exxon’s failure to act would result in harm to the subsequent lessee). 
 217.  Compare Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 253, 492 A.2d 1297, 1306 (1985) (finding that 
although probation officers owed a duty to the court to report any probation violations, this duty 
did not extend to the general public) and Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 447, 
499–500, 805 A.2d 372, 403 (2002) (explaining that 911 operators do not owe a duty in tort to the 
general public absent a special relationship between the operator and the specific individual, 
because to hold otherwise “might jeopardize the availability” of 911 services), with Henley, 305 
Md. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341 (finding that, even if those persons who would likely be injured 
could not be identified in advance, an employer owed a duty to those persons foreseeably injured 
by his employee). 
 218.  See Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 553, 727 A.2d 947, 951 (1999) 
(explaining that the class of persons to whom the gun storeowner would owe a duty to protect 
from the theft and illegal use of weapons was “indeterminate”). 
 219.  Id. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950.   
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another from criminal acts by a third person.220  Yet this is an overly-
simplified account of Scott’s holding because the Scott court also held that 
if a landlord knew of criminal action taking place in the common areas of 
his property, he had a “duty to take reasonable measures . . . to eliminate the 
conditions contributing to the criminal activity.”221  Thus, Scott indicated 
not that a special relationship was required to find the gun store owner 
liable as the Valentine court suggested, but rather that where a retail 
merchant knew of circumstances indicating that his weapons are likely to be 
stolen and used illegally, he owed a duty to exercise ordinary care in 
eliminating those conditions by securing the weapons.222  Applied to the 
facts of Warr, Valentine actually suggests that the tavern staff, aware of 
Eaton’s intoxicated condition and his intent to drive,223 owed a duty of 
reasonable care to rectify that danger by refraining from serving Eaton after 
he became visibly intoxicated.  While the Warr court concluded that 
imposing a duty on the tavern is contrary to Maryland law set out in 
Valentine,224 the tavern’s awareness that its patron would pose harm to 
other drivers makes the case so distinguishable from Valentine that its 
reasoning does not apply. 
2. Assigning the Tavern a Duty to Refrain from Serving Visibly 
Intoxicated Patrons Based on Section 315 Protects Foreseeable 
Victims of Drunk Driving, Not the Public as a Whole 
The Warr court reasoned that courts that judicially adopted dram shop 
liability—specifically Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Texas—applied Section 
315 to uphold a tavern’s duty to protect the public as a whole.225  However, 
this characterization of other states’ reasoning is overbroad.  The Warr 
court should have acknowledged that these states frame liability under 
                                                          
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976) (emphasis omitted). 
 222.  See Valentine, 353 Md. at 560–61, 727 A.2d at 955 (Raker, J., concurring) (explaining 
that gun merchants owe a duty to secure their product because the theft of an unsecured handgun 
to be used for violent crime is foreseeable, but that no facts indicated that the merchant had 
actually breached this duty of care). 
 223.  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Warr v. JMGM Group, No. 341698-V, at 9 (Mont. 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 224.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 193–94, 70 A.3d 347, 361 (2013).  The Warr court 
also pointed out Maryland courts have previously applied the “special relationship” rule to the 
drunk driving context.  Id. at 194, 70 A.3d at 361 (citing Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, 
Inc., 70 Md. Ct. Spec. App. 244, 520 A.2d 1115 (1987)).  However, this example is unconvincing 
because the Kuykendall court identified the crux of its holding as the absence of some affirmative 
action by the employer to order the employee to drive despite knowing his level of intoxication.  
Kuykendall, 70 Md. Ct. Spec. App. at 250–51, 520 A.2d at 1117–18.  As argued previously, 
however, a tavern’s role in serving its patron past the point of visible intoxication is properly 
conceptualized as an affirmative action.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 225.  Warr, 433 Md. at 192–93, 70 A.3d at 360–61. 
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Section 315 as the duty to refrain from serving an intoxicated patron in 
order to protect those foreseeable victims of drunk driving because doing so 
would have allowed the court to impose liability to the tavern based on 
Section 315. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Jardine focused 
its liability analysis on the foreseeability of an intoxicated patron causing 
harm to those around him.226  The court reasoned that the patron was 
intoxicated when the tavern sold him liquor, and such excessive alcohol 
consumption made him a danger to the community.227  Drawing on 
Jardine’s authority, lower Pennsylvania courts have cited Section 315 for 
the proposition that a tavern does not act as a reasonable person would 
when it sells liquor to an intoxicated patron because it is further putting at 
risk those that might be injured by that patron.228 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona relied on Section 315 in 
adopting dram shop liability, citing it for the proposition that “the common 
law recognizes a duty to take affirmative measures to control or avoid 
increasing the danger from the conduct of others.”229  Since Arizona 
precedent already recognized the duty of a tavern operator to protect his 
patrons from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of another 
patron,230 the court in Ontiveros merely extended this principle to apply to 
non-patrons that would be foreseeably injured outside of the tavern.231  The 
Ontiveros court reasoned that the “relation of the licensed supplier of liquor 
and his patron” afforded the tavern owner a degree of control over his 
patrons.232  Therefore, the tavern owed a duty to protect those in the 
                                                          
 226.  See Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 198 A.2d 550, 553 (Pa. 1964) (“[A]n 
intoxicated person is and can be an instrument of danger to others, especially if he is operating a 
motor vehicle.”). 
 227.  See id. (commenting that an intoxicated person behind the wheel is as dangerous to the 
community as “a stick of dynamite”); see also Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 205 A.2d 873, 876 (Pa. 
1965) (explaining that “it is the high probability that intoxicated persons will be injured that, in 
part, gave rise to the statute prohibiting defendant from serving the plaintiff when visibly 
intoxicated”). 
 228.  See, e.g., Rivero v. Timblin, No. CI-09-08267, 2010 WL2914400, at *246–47 (Pa. Com. 
Pl. Mar. 16, 2010) (“In selling liquor to an intoxicated patron, where there is evidence that the 
customer may injure himself or others as a result of the intoxication, a vendor is not acting as a 
reasonable person would.”).  Jardine “has been cited in at least 18 jurisdictions around the country 
as recognizing a common-law cause of action against a licensee for injuries caused by an 
intoxicated customer.”  Id. at 247–48. 
 229.  Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 508–09 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc). 
 230.  See McFarlin v. Hall, 619 P.2d 729, 733–34 (Ariz. 1980) (en banc) (recognizing that a 
tavern owner had a duty to protect a patron who was stabbed at the hands of another patron in the 
tavern’s parking lot, when that the tavern owner was aware that the patron had a propensity for 
violence and had recently been in jail). 
 231.  Ontiveros, 667 P.2d at 208. 
 232.  Id.  
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surrounding community who might be injured from the acts of its visibly 
intoxicated patrons.233  Following Ontiveros, Arizona courts have not 
invoked Section 315 to impose an indefinite duty to the public, but rather to 
impose a duty to take reasonable steps to control the actions of patrons 
under a tavern keeper’s control.234 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Texas cited Section 315 when it adopted 
dram shop liability in El Chico Corp. v. Poole.235  The El Chico court 
recognized that a tavern, in acting affirmatively to serve a patron after he 
was visibly intoxicated, owed a duty to protect those foreseeably injured by 
a drunk driver.236  Similar to courts in Pennsylvania and Arizona, the 
Supreme Court of Texas noted that Section 315 reflected a “duty to take 
affirmative action to control or avoid increasing the danger from another’s 
conduct which the actor has at least partially created.”237  Although the El 
Chico court articulated the tavern’s duty as one owed to “the general 
public,” it specifically framed its holding around the Texas Alcoholic 
Beverage Code’s purpose “to protect the safety and welfare of the general 
public.”238  The Warr court took this holding to mean that Section 315 may 
only be applied without a special relationship when the law accepts that an 
actor owes a duty to the public at large.239  The El Chico court, however, 
still acknowledged the duty of an alcoholic beverage licensee to protect 
                                                          
 233.  Id. at 211. 
 234.  See, e.g., Hebert v. Club 37 Bar, 701 P.2d 847, 849–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (declining 
to find a tavern owner liable after a frequent patron shot another in an alcoholic blackout, 
reasoning that while tavern owners are under a duty of care and may be held liable when they sell 
liquor to an intoxicated customer, the bar in this case had no ability to foresee the patron’s 
extraordinary actions since he exhibited no violent tendencies); see also Patterson v. Thunder 
Pass, Inc., 153 P.3d 1064, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the tavern had fulfilled its duty 
of affirmative care to a patron and the public after cutting off the intoxicated patron and driving 
her home when a taxi could not be obtained, since the tavern had no way of knowing that the 
patron would return to the bar to retrieve her vehicle the same night, injuring another driver in a 
head-on collision). 
 235.  732 S.W. 2d 306, 312 (Tex. 1987). 
 236.  See id. at 309 (affirming the lower court’s holding that a tavern owner who encourages a 
patron to drink too much and serves him while he is visibly intoxicated, knowing that he will 
operate a vehicle, owes a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent him from driving and 
causing foreseeable injury). 
 237.  Id. at 312. 
 238.  Id. at 313; see also Chapa v. Club Corp. of America, 737 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. App. 
1987) (commenting that the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that the Alcoholic Beverage Code 
“was enacted to protect the safety of the general public”); Fuller v. Maxus Energy, Corp., 841 
S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. App. 1992) (noting that “El Chico recognized the duty of an alcoholic 
beverage licensee . . . not to serve a person when the licensee knows or should know that the 
patron is intoxicated” based on both the general principles of negligence and the Alcoholic 
Beverage Code). 
 239.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 193, 70 A.3d 347, 361 (2013). 
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victims foreseeably harmed by drunk driving.240  That Texas chose to tailor 
its holding to fit the state’s existing law does not negate the alternate 
framing of the issue as a duty to foreseeable victims of drunk driving, and 
certainly would not prevent Maryland from adopting the latter approach. 
Thus, the Warr court erred in its conclusion that imposing a duty on 
the tavern under Section 315 would be contrary to Maryland law.  The court 
should have characterized the class of persons owed a duty by the tavern as 
those drivers foreseeably harmed by an intoxicated patron.  This would 
have allowed the court to apply Section 315 consistently with both 
Maryland and other states’ third-party liability jurisprudence, and find that 
the Dogfish Head owed a duty to protect the Warrs. 
C.  The Warr Court’s Reliance on Lamb Produces Results That Are 
Contrary to the Deterrence and Compensation Goals of the Tort 
System, and Do Not Protect the Interests of Maryland Citizens 
While the common law proximate cause argument that “[h]uman 
beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts”241 carries 
considerable weight in the minds of courts that recognize dram shop 
liability,242 the Warr court erred by failing to consider the utility of holding 
a tavern liable for the torts of its patrons in the context of our societal 
understanding of drunk driving.  The court should have recognized that 
imposing dram shop liability can deter dangerous serving practices and 
more fairly compensate injured victims while still protecting businesses.243 
1. Dram Shop Liability Can Deter Dangerous Serving Practices 
States that have enacted dram shop liability do so in part to deter 
taverns from sending highly intoxicated patrons out onto the road.244  Drunk 
driving is a well-documented problem in Maryland and throughout the 
nation: The most current data from the National Highway Traffic Safety 
                                                          
 240.  See El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 311 (concluding that injury to a third person was no longer 
unforeseeable since drunk driving fatalities had become so frequent within the state, and that 
“based on foreseeability, the duty of an alcoholic beverage licensee is apparent”). 
 241.  State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951). 
 242.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765, 766 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (referring to Hatfield 
for the common law proximate cause argument but deciding that such reasoning is not sufficient 
to protect the public from the acts of intoxicated persons); Hutchens v. Hankins, 303 S.E.2d 584, 
588, 595–97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Hatfield as one of a “handful of courts . .  [that] follow 
the old rule of nonliability,” but finding more persuasive the reasoning that the consumption, 
resulting intoxication, and injury producing conduct are foreseeable intervening causes). 
 243.  Smith, supra note 191, at 554. 
 244.  See Frank A. Sloan et al., Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J. L. & 
ECON. 473, 498–99 (2000) (finding that dram shop liability laws were effective in preventing 
servers from engaging in unsafe practices and preventing excessive alcohol use). 
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Administration (“NHTSA”) show that in 2012, about 10,000 fatal crashes 
were the result of drunk driving.245  In Maryland, alcohol-impaired driving 
resulted in 160 fatalities, representing about a third of all traffic deaths in 
the state.246  Exposing taverns to liability for the torts of their patrons would 
help prevent these fatalities by forcing taverns to be more vigilant in 
monitoring to whom they serve alcohol and how much they are serving.247  
Moreover, studies show that a substantial reduction in alcohol-related harm 
results from the enforcement and prosecution of dram shop laws.248  In fact, 
courts and legislatures began to reestablish dram shop legislation in the 
1980s as a response to the increased prevalence of drunk driving and the 
resulting fatalities.249 
Although Maryland law mandates that liquor provider licensees in 
many counties undergo training in alcohol awareness programs,250 the 
continuing carnage on Maryland’s roads as a result of drunk driving 
accidents clearly indicates that these programs are insufficient.  The current 
scheme of liability insulates a tavern—the party best able to prevent an 
accident—from any responsibility to other drivers.251  In upholding this 
liability scheme, the Warr court has forced the community surrounding the 
Dogfish Head to rely on the judgment of highly intoxicated patrons like 
Eaton to make the right decision not to drive.252 
                                                          
 245.  NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2012 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: 
OVERVIEW 6 tbl.9 (2013), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811856.pdf. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  See Sloan et al., supra note 244, at 495–96 (studying the deterrent effect of dram shop 
liability law and concluding that these laws help taverns prevent patrons from excessively 
consuming alcohol). 
 248.  See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., PREVENTING 
OVER-CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL – SALES TO THE INTOXICATED AND “HAPPY HOUR” (DRINK 
SPECIAL) LAWS 3 (revised 2005) (finding that laws restricting the sale of alcohol to intoxicated 
persons can reduce alcohol-related harm if adequately enforced); see also Alexander C. Wagenaar 
& Harold D. Holder, Effects of Alcoholic Beverage Server Liability on Traffic Crash Injuries, 15 
ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL RES. 942, 947 (1991) (conducting an empirical 
study in Texas that found exposing taverns to liability prompted servers to cut off obviously 
intoxicated patrons and assist them in using alternate transportation, resulting in a “statistically 
significant reduction in alcohol-related traffic crashes”). 
 249.  See Smith, supra note 191, at 556 (explaining that although most states repealed their 
Dram Shop Acts after the end of Prohibition, “[b]y 1987, at least twenty-eight states had 
reestablished some form of tort liability for the sale of alcohol”). 
 250.  MD. CODE ANN., Art. 2b, § 13-101 (West 2013).  Counties requiring alcohol awareness 
training programs include Montgomery (the site of the accident at issue in Warr), Howard, Kent, 
Washington, and Caroline.  Id. 
 251.  Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970) (explaining that the most 
efficient approach to avoiding future accidents is to assign liability to the entity that “could avoid 
the accident costs most cheaply”). 
 252.  See id. at 312 (noting that “a system of accident law that minimizes the effect of 
accidents on the poor . . . emphasiz[es] deep pocket secondary cost avoidance”). 
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2. Dram Shop Liability Can More Fairly Compensate Injured 
Victims While Still Protecting Businesses 
Furthermore, dram shop liability is an effective tool to compensate the 
victims of drunk driving accidents because the insurance policies of drunk 
drivers may be inadequate to compensate severely injured victims.  The 
NHTSA estimated that an alcohol-involved crash costs a victim anywhere 
from a few thousand dollars to over one million dollars, depending on the 
severity of the injury.253  Dram shop liability creates a far more efficient 
scheme of compensation because it assigns the cost of the accident to the 
tavern’s insurance policy.254  While this means that tavern insurance 
policies might increase slightly in price,255 the effect, if an increase 
occurred, is that the community as a whole would pay to compensate an 
innocent drunk driving victim, instead of the victim bearing the cost alone.  
Thus, recognizing dram shop liability creates a more efficient allocation of 
costs.256  The court’s decision in Warr instead means that the Warrs cannot 
recover from JMGM Group for the death of their ten-year-old 
granddaughter, notwithstanding the fact that the tavern continued to serve 
Eaton past the point of visible intoxication and unleashed him in this 
dangerous condition onto Interstate-270.257 
The experiences of other states are instructive in analyzing the 
potential success of dram shop liability law to protect Maryland citizens 
from drunk drivers while still allowing taverns to operate as economically 
viable businesses.  At present, dram shop liability is fairly uniform: In most 
jurisdictions, a tavern “may be held liable for selling . . . alcohol to . . . a 
visibly intoxicated person,” though generally a tavern’s “customers may not 
recover for injuries caused by their own intoxication.”258  States do not 
                                                          
 253.  NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MOTOR 
VEHICLE CRASHES, 2000, 41 tbl.12 (2002).  
 254.  See Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents: A Reassessment 64 
MD. L. REV. 12, 18–19 (2005) (explaining that the fault system of tort law deters accidents by 
decentralizing and privatizing the losses “through its effect on liability-insurance premiums”). 
 255.  See Civil Action—Wrongfully Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages: Hearing on 
S.B. 209 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm., 2014 Leg., 431st Sess. (Md. 2014) (statement 
of Melvin R. Thompson, Senior Vice President, Gov’t Affairs and Pub. Policy, Maryland Rest. 
Ass’n) (expressing concern that a proposed dram shop liability statute would substantially 
increase liability insurance rates, and this cost may also be passed on to consumers in the form of 
slightly higher alcohol prices). 
 256.  See Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of 
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1965) (explaining that “if many pay the cost of an accident 
rather than one . . . the social dislocation costs of the accident may be reduced; this is the basis of 
the theory of loss spreading.  And even if loss spreading means no spreading—if it means only 
that the man with the deeper pockets pays—the same cost-reduction effect may be said to exist.”). 
 257.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 173–77, 70 A.3d 347, 349–51 (2013). 
 258.  Smith, supra note 191, at 557. 
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impose unlimited liability upon taverns; many states have made substantial 
efforts to protect taverns by, for example, apportioning liability between the 
tavern and the intoxicated individual.259 
In addition, many state legislatures have limited a dram shop’s liability 
by imposing damage caps, sometimes set as low as $50,000.260  These 
damage caps benefit taverns by lessening the possibility that a suit will put 
the dram shop out of business and allowing the dram shop to purchase less 
insurance than it would have to otherwise purchase.261  Further, in these 
types of suits, punitive damages are generally unavailable.262  While this 
approach may unfairly limit an injured plaintiff’s possibility of 
compensation when medical expenses arising from an accident exceed the 
limits of an applicable damage cap, it is still a valid tool with which states 
can experiment to ensure that drunk driving victims have some, albeit 
imperfect, method of compensation.263 
Furthermore, state legislatures have limited the potential liability of 
taverns by imposing heightened evidentiary requirements.  For example, the 
vast majority of states provide a cause of action for drunk driving torts 
resulting from the sale of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated patron.264  A 
successful plaintiff must prove by eyewitness testimony and by blood 
alcohol reading at the time of injury that the customer was visibly 
intoxicated at the time of service.265  This standard may be difficult for 
plaintiffs to meet, as tavern employees rarely admit to serving a patron who 
is visibly intoxicated.266  Other states require that the plaintiff also prove the 
tavern knew or should have known that the intoxicated patron would soon 
be driving an automobile.267 
                                                          
 259.  See id. at 572 (discussing contribution claims). 
 260.  Id. at 573. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Tullar, 285 S.W.3d 290, 298–99 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that 
punitive damages are unavailable under Kentucky’s Dram Shop Act); Steak & Ale of Texas, Inc., 
v. Borneman, 62 S.W.3d 898, 909 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding that Texas’s Dram Shop Act 
precludes recovery of punitive damages). 
 263.  See Smith, supra note 191, at 573 (noting that the goal in this approach is to compensate 
people who have been harmed in tort). 
 264.  See id. at 559 (explaining that only Florida, North Carolina, and Wisconsin do not use the 
visibly intoxicated standard). 
 265.  Id. at 559–60. 
 266.  See, e.g., Reed v. Breton, 718 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Mich. 2006) (finding that a plaintiff, in 
order to rebut the statutory presumption of the tavern’s nonliability, must present evidence of 
actual, visible intoxication, including the testimony of a server trained to recognize intoxication). 
 267.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40 (2000) (providing that a person who “knowingly . . . 
serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that 
such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may become liable for injury or damage caused 
by or resulting from the intoxication . . . when the sale . . . is the proximate cause of such injury or 
damage”).  
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Illustratively, while the Supreme Court of Texas in El Chico held that 
“an alcoholic beverage licensee owes a duty to the general public not to 
serve alcoholic beverages to a person when the licensee knows or should 
know the patron is intoxicated,”268 the Texas legislature that same week 
passed a Dram Shop Act.269  The statute protected taverns by creating a 
more onerous burden of proof where plaintiffs had to prove that at the time 
of sale, “it was apparent to the provider that the individual being . . . 
served . . . was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear 
danger to himself and to others.”270  A recent study found that most states 
have similarly tightened restrictions on tavern liability, thereby “limit[ing] 
the scope of the courts’ rulings,” since dram shop laws were adopted in the 
1980s.271  Indeed, many states impose a higher burden of proof, stronger 
evidentiary requirements, or have tightened damage caps.272 
While taverns are productive members of Maryland’s economy, it is 
imperative that they function responsibly.  That other states struggle to both 
provide a cause of action for injured plaintiffs and protect taverns from 
exposure to unlimited liability reflects the difficulty in finding this balance.  
Yet in Warr, rather than compensating the Warrs for the tragic death of 
their granddaughter, the Court of Appeals of Maryland left the decision of 
whether to apply dram shop liability to the General Assembly.273  The Warr 
court decided that the legislature’s “failure to enact dram shop liability 
reflected that its imposition was disfavored as a matter of public policy.”274  
Legislative inaction does not, however, reflect the policy of the state; it is 
the court’s responsibility to change the common law to take into account 
changing societal conditions.275  The court had the power to bring the Warrs 
justice by recognizing a cause of action and the potential for compensation, 
without the family having to battle against industry cries of economic 
catastrophe and judicial uncertainty that sound in the state legislature on 
                                                          
 268.  732 S.W.2d 306, 314 (Tex. 1987). 
 269.  See Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1997) (noting the act superseded the 
holding in El Chico). 
 270.  TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.02(b)(1) (West 2005). 
 271.  James F. Mosher et al., Commercial Host (Dram Shop) Liability Current Status and 
Trends, 45 AM. J. PREV. MED. 347, 348 (2013). 
 272.  Id. at 350–51. 
 273.  Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 199, 70 A.3d 347, 364 (2013). 
 274.  Id. at 179–80, 70 A.3d at 353. 
 275.  See Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning Liability in Maryland 
Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV. 
701, 712–19 (2014) (similarly arguing that the Court of Appeals of Maryland should not have 
deferred to the state legislature to adopt comparative negligence in part because Maryland 
precedent indicates that the court is not precluded from incorporating the substance of a proposed 
bill into law merely because it failed to pass in the General Assembly). 
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this topic.276  Indeed, the Warr court’s holding that the tavern has no 
responsibility to protect the community from a patron who they served over 
twenty drinks is intuitively troubling and does not reflect the best interests 
of the people of Maryland. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Warr v. JMGM Group, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
concluded that a tavern does not owe a duty to protect the public from the 
torts of its patrons absent a special relationship.277  The court’s analysis of 
liability was premised on the incorrect assumption that the relevant conduct 
to consider when determining whether a duty exists is the tavern’s omission 
in failing to prevent its visibly intoxicated patron from driving.278  Instead, 
the court should have considered the tavern’s affirmative conduct in serving 
Eaton after he was visibly intoxicated.279  Focusing on actions rather than 
omissions aligns with Maryland’s and other states’ case law,280 the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,281 as well as the deterrence and 
compensation goals of the tort system.282  Had the court looked to the 
tavern’s actions in serving a visibly intoxicated patron as the relevant 
conduct for determining liability, it would have determined that the tavern 
owed a duty to protect the Warrs as foreseeable victims of drunk driving.283 
                                                          
 276.  See id. at 768 (noting that the courts have an advantage in adopting policies like 
comparative negligence—or dram shop liability—because they are “somewhat insulated from the 
powerful political forces that block” reform in the legislature); see also Brief of the Maryland 
State Licensed Beverage Ass’n, Inc. and the Rest. Ass’n of Maryland, Inc. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, Warr v. JMGM Group, 433 Md. 170, 70 A.3d 347 (2013) (No. 57), 2013 
WL 1945961, at *10 nn.7–8 (arguing that “considerable uncertainty” and “potential meaningful 
economic impacts on small businesses” would result should the court choose to adopt dram shop 
liability). 
 277.  Warr, 433 Md. at 199, 70 A.3d at 364. 
 278.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 279.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 280.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 281.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 282.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 283.  See supra Parts IV.A–B. 
